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under

887

DUE PROCESS

1994]
-the

Federal Constitution 388 and the New York State

Constitution. 3 8 9

Both

the

state

and

federal

due

process

protections governing ancillary trial proceedings are evaluated by
the standard articulated in Snyder: whether the defendant's
presence will contribute to his defense. 3 9 0 The court of appeals
noted that there have been occasions in which it has afforded the

defendant greater due process rights than those guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution. 3 9 1 However, under both a state and federal

due process analysis, a defendant has no right to attend a
proceeding which evaluates the testimonial capacity of a
witness.

3 92

393

People v. Outley
(decided February 16, 1993)

In separate actions decided as companion cases, the defendants
in Outley, Maietta and Ogtong contested enhanced criminal
sentences imposed against them for violating no-arrest conditions
in their plea agreements. 3 94 Defendants claimed that when a

defendant denies post-plea criminal conduct, in keeping with the
state395 and federal396 constitutional requirements of due process,

the court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the
validity of the defendant's post-plea arrest. 3 9 7 The New York
388. 80 N.Y.2d at 457,. 606 N.E.2d at 958, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. See, e.g., People v. Antommarchi, 80 N.Y.2d 247, 250, 804 N.E.2d
95, 97, 590 N.Y.S.2d 33, 35 (1992) (stating that a court may conduct side-bar
conferences in defendant's absence in order to determine a juror's testimonial
capacity but may not look into a potential juror's "ability to weigh the evidence
objectively unless defendant is present"); People v. Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d 656,
656, 595 N.E.2d 836, 836, 584 N.Y.S.2d 761, 761.
392. Morales, 80 N.Y.2d at 457, 606 N.E.2d at 958, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
393. 80 N.Y.2d 702, 610 N.E.2d 356, 594 N.Y.S.2d 683 (1993).
394. Id. at 707, 610 N.E.2d at 358, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 685.
395. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law.").
396. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . .

").

397. Outley, 80 N.Y.2d at 712, 610 N.E.2d at 361, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 688.
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Court of Appeals held that the inquiry conducted in each case
was sufficient for the sentencing court to conclude that there was
a legitimate basis for the arrest as a precondition for imposing
enhanced sentences.398
In Outley, the defendant pleaded guilty to charges of sexual
abuse. 399 During the plea bargaining stage, the court agreed to
sentence the defendant to a period of probation on the condition
that the defendant "'not be arrested on any other charges during

the adjournment period.'

400

The transcripts of the plea plainly

indicated that the defendant understood this conditional provision
and voluntarily accepted it. 4 0 1 When the defendant appeared for
sentencing six weeks later, it was revealed that he had been
arrested on a criminal contempt charge just one month and four
days after his original plea hearing. 402 In defense of his arrest,
the defendant argued that he lacked the "'requisite criminal intent
403
to defy [the orders] to constitute a criminal contempt.'
Thereafter, the defendant argued that a "hearing was necessary to
determine whether it could be shown 'by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant' had, in fact, 'committ[ed] the
crimes' . . . and that without 'an evidentiary hearing' the court
lacked the power to impose an enhanced sentence." 404 "After
reviewing the unfavorable probation report, the court ..."
increased the defendants' original probation sentence to one year

398. Id. at 713, 610 N.E.2d at 361, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 688.
399. Id. at 707, 610 N.E.2d at 358, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 685.
400. Id. at 707-08, 610 N.E.2d at 358, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 685.
401. Id. at 708, 610 N.E.2d at 358, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 685 ("The court stated
to defendant: 'If you violate any of these conditions, [the court] will not be
bound by my promise, and [the court] will be free to sentence you to whatever
the case allows, in this case, up to one year in prison. Do you understand
that?' Defendant replied, 'Yes.'").
402. Id. (The defendant was arrested on a charge of criminal contempt for
violating two court orders "directing him to stay away from his wife and
daughter and their residence.").
403. Id. ("Defendant explained that. . . his violation of the orders 'was not
done with malice', . . . and [that] 'there was no bad intent whatsoever.'").

404. Id.
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in a rehabilitation center. 405 This ruling was subsequently

affirmed by the appellate division. 406
The facts in the Maietta and Ogtong cases presented similar
circumstances. Essentially, in both cases, the defendants entered
guilty pleas on a condition imposed by the trial judge that they
not find themselves arrested on any criminal charge prior to the
time of their final sentencing hearing. 40 7 Subsequent to their plea
arrangements, each defendant was arrested on a new criminal

charge. 408 In both instances, a full evidentiary hearing on the
matter was not conducted, 409 and the judge enhanced the
sentence that was originally agreed to by the defendant, based
upon the defendant's breach of the no-arrest provision of the
plea. 4 10 On appeal, both cases were affirmed by the appellate
term. 4 1 1

405. Id. ("Moreover, the court noted, defendant's wife... had called the
police and... had signed a sworn affidavit attesting to the allegations in the
criminal contempt complaint, indicating she wanted the Order of Protection
enforced.").
406. 173 A.D.2d 17, 578 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1st Dep't 1991).
407. 80 N.Y.2d at 711, 610 N.E.2d at 359-60, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 686-87. In
Maietta, the defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of stolen property
in the third degree. Id at 709, 610 N.E.2d at 359, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 686. In
Ogtong the defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a weapon in the
third degree. Id. at 711, 610 N.E.2d at 360, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
408. Id. at 709, 711, 610 N.E.2d at 359, 360 594 N.Y.S.2d at 686, 687. In
Maietta, the defendant was arrested for burglary between his plea hearing and
sentencing hearing. Id. at 709, 610 N.E.2d at 359, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 686. In
Ogtong, the defendant was arrested for criminal possession of a controlled
substance in the seventh degree between his plea hearing and sentencing
hearing. Id. at 711, 610 N.E.2d at 360, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
409. Id. at 710-712, 610 N.E.2d at 359-360, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 686-687. In
Maietta, the defendant attempted to show that although his vehicle was used in
the burglary he had nothing to do with it. The Ogtong defendant attempted to
show that he only possessed a residue amount of cocaine and argued that it was
a mere technical violation. Id.
410. Id. at 709-712, 610 N.E.2d at 359-360, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 686-687. In
Maietta, the defendant's conditional sentence was increased from
imprisonment of four to eight years to 10 to 20 years, and in Ogtong the
defendant's conditional sentence was increased from five years probation to
imprisonment of 1 1/4 to 3 3/4 years. Id.
411. Ogtong, 185 A.D.2d 253, 586 N.Y.S.2d 19.
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At issue in each case before the New York Court of Appeals
was whether the minimum requirements of due process were
complied with when the defendant, who faced an enhanced
sentence stemming from his breach of a no-arrest condition, was
denied a full evidentiary hearing to explain his conduct or lack
thereof. 4 12 The court held that when a defendant denies the postplea criminal conduct, the sentencing court is not required to
conduct a full evidentiary hearing "to satisfy itself by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has, in fact,
committed the crime for which he was arrested."413 The court
noted that "[i]mposing such a requirement would have the effect
of changing the condition of the plea bargain from not being
'4 14
arrested for a crime to not actually committing a crime."
Furthermore, the court reasoned "that the proposed evidentiary
hearing rule, if adopted, would have the undesirable consequence
of requiring, in effect, a 'minitrial' of the defendant's guilt or
innocence on the new charge." 4 15 However, the court did not
completely dismiss the requirements of due process, rather it
required a discretionary hearing for the trial judge in which the
inquiry wQuld remain flexible and informal. 4 16 The court stated
that:
Obviously, the mere fact of the arrest, without more, is not
enough. A no-arrest condition could certainly not be held to have
been breached by arrests which are malicious or merely baseless.
When an issue is raised concerning the, validity of the postplea
charge or there is a denial of any involvement in the underlying
crime, the court must conduct an inquiry at which the defendant
has an opportunity to show that the arrest is without foundation.
The nature and extent of the inquiry - whether through a
summary hearing pursuant to CPL 400.10 or some other fair
means - is within the court's discretion. The inquiry must be of
412. 80 N.Y.2d at 712, 610 N.E.2d at 361, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 688.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 712-13, 610 N.E.2d at 361, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 688 (citations
omitted).

415. Id. at 713, 610 N.E.2d at 361, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 688 (citing Maietta,
173 A.D.2d at 24, 578 N.Y.S.2d 529).
416. Id.
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sufficient depth, however, so that the court can be satisfied not of defendant's guilt of the new criminal charge but of the
4 17
existence of a legitimate basis for the arrest on that charge.
Ultimately, the court concluded that "the inquiry conducted [in
each case] was sufficient so that the sentencing court could be
satisfied that there was a legitimate basis for the arrest." 4 18 In
Outley, the court held that the sentencing court did not err in
finding a legitimate foundation for the new charge. 4 19 Similarly,
in Maietta, the court found that the "record establishe[d] a solid
factual and legal basis for the postplea arrest .
"..."420
The court
in Ogtong held that the record was "sufficient to establish a
breach of the no-arrest condition. . . [t]he sentencing court
afforded defendant an adequate opportunity to explain the
circumstances of the arrest."421
Thus, the New York courts have found that due process does
not require a full evidentiary hearing when a defendant faces an
enhanced sentence for allegedly breaching a no-arrest condition.
For example, in New York v. Harrison,422 the defendant asserted
that "his due process rights were violated because the court gave
improper consideration to extraneous crimes in imposing his
sentence." 423 The court, however, found the defendant's claim to
be baseless, stating that "[a] sentencing court may properly
consider a defendant's subsequent arrests, especially where the
court expressly conditioned its earlier sentencing promise on
defendant's good conduct."424
Similarly, in New York v. Kihm, 42 5 the defendant claimed that
the imposition of "an enhanced sentence because of a mere
accusation is violative of the due process."426 The court,
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 713, 610 N.E.2d at 361, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 688.
Id. at 713-14, 610 N.E.2d at 361, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 688.
Id. at 714, 610 N.E.2d at 361, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 688.
Id. at 714, 610 N.E.2d at 362, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 689.
161 A.D.2d 550, 556 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1st Dep't 1990).
Id. at 551, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 55.

Id.
143 A.D.2d 199, 532 N.Y.S.2d 11 (2d Dep't 1988).
Id.
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however, found that "before the enhanced sentence was imposed,
the defendant was afforded the opportunity to deny or explain his
arrest ... which due process requires." 427 The court reasoned
that when the defendant was given the opportunity to explain his
situation, he "came forward with no information casting doubt on
the fact of his arrest ... so as to warrant further or more formal
inquiry.,, 428
The New York courts have, however, remanded cases on
appeal from enhanced sentences with a no-arrest condition when
it was found that the defendant may actually have had a
justifiable excuse for his arrest, thereby putting his alleged
breach of the no-arrest condition in doubt. For instance, in New
York v. Banks429 the defendant was arrested subsequent to his
plea. 430 The defendant asserted that there was an explanation for
his arrest. 43 1 However, the lower court disregarded the
defendant's explanation and gave the defendant a more serious
sentence. 432 In this appeal, the court found that the trial court
"deprived [the] defendant of his right to a meaningful opportunity
to refute the single, aggravating factor which influenced the court
in increasing defendant's punishment." 433 Indeed, the court
pointed out that "[o]ffenses committed by a defendant, even those
for which he has not been convicted, may properly be submitted
434
to the court as factors to be considered in imposing sentence."

427. Id. at 199, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 11-12 (citations omitted).
428. Id. at 199, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 12 (citations omitted).
429. 161 A.D.2d 957, 557 N.Y.S.2d 529 (3d Dep't 1990).

430. Id. at 957, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 530. The defendant pled guilty to two
counts of burglary and was arrested for criminal possession of stolen property
in the fourth degree prior to his sentencing hearing. Id. at 957-58, 557
N.Y.S.2d at 530.
431. Id. at 958, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 530. The defendant asserted that he was
merely a passenger in a stolen vehicle, that the vehicle was stolen by someone
other than himself, and that he had no knowledge that the vehicle was stolen.
Id.

432. Id.
433. Id. at 958, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
434. Id. (citation omitted).
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In New York v. Faulkner435 the defendant pleaded guilty to
attempted sale of a controlled substance. 4 36 In exchange he
received a youthful offender status and a shorter sentence which
was conditioned on not being arrested before his sentencing
hearing. 437 At his sentencing hearing, it was revealed that he had
been arrested. 438 The defendant argued that he was completely
innocent of the charge. 439 However, the trial court entirely
disregarded the defendant's argument, denied him youthful
offender status and imposed a harsher sentence than what was
part of the original agreement. 440 In this appeal, the court
vacated the trial court's sentence and ruled that "[w]hen [the]
defendant disputed the validity of the subsequent arrest and
criminal charge, [the trial] [c]ourt should have afforded him the
opportunity to refute the subsequent charge at a presentence
conference." 44 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
ruled consistently with the New York standard regarding due
process requirements for sentencing. In Innes v. Dalsheim,442 the
court overturned the defendant's enhanced sentence. 443 However,
it did not do so because the defendant was deprived of an
evidentiary hearing in order to determine the validity of the
arrest. 444 Rather, the sentence was vacated because it was found

435. 182 A.D.2d 1025, 583 N.Y.S.2d 542 (3d Dep't 1992).
436. Id. at 1025, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
437. Id. The defendant "pleaded guilty to attempted criminal sale of a
controlled substance in the third degree pursuant to an agreement that he would
be granted youthful offender treatment and sentenced to a prison term of 1-3
years." Id.
438. Id. at 1026, 583 N.Y.S.2d 543. The "defendant had been arrested and
indicted for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree." Id.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id. (citation omitted).

442. 864 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1988).
443. Id. at 980. The defendant was originally charged with robbery and was
arrested again for robbery subsequent to entering a conditional plea. Id. at 975.
The plea was contingent upon not being arrested between his plea and
sentencing hearings. Id.
444. Id. at 980.
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that "[u]nder [the] plea agreement, it [could not] safely be said
that Innes voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his
right to a jury trial."' 44 5 Because of this, the court explained,
"whatever waiver [defendant] agreed to was without adequate
knowledge of the consequences flowing from his breach of the
plea agreement." 446 Therefore, the defendant was denied his due
process protections.447
Additionally, in United States v. Lee448 the Second Circuit
stated that "a district court judge's discretion when imposing
sentence is 'largely unlimited either as to the kind of information
that he may consider, or the source from which it may
come. ' '44 9 The court explained that "[d]ue process is violated
when the information on which the defendant is sentenced is
'materially untrue' or is, in fact, 'misinformation.'450 The court
noted that a sentencing court is required to insure that the
information that it uses in fixing the punishment is "reliable and
accurate."' 45 1 Ultimately, the court held that "the district court is
under no duty to conduct a full-blown evidentiary hearing in each
instance where information in a pre-sentence report is challenged.
Nor does the convicted defendant have an absolute right to
4 52
demand that kind of hearing.'
In sum, both New York and Federal law are in accord by
asserting that the constitutional guarantee of due process does not
mandate that a defendant who enters a plea bargain, which is
conditional upon a no-arrest provision, must absolutely receive a
full evidentiary hearing for an alleged breach of the condition
before the sentence can be enhanced. Rather, due process only
requires that the defendant have a reasonable opportunity to be
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id.

448. 818 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1987). The defendant was the leader of a
Chinese gang that was charged with various RICO violations. Id. at 1053.
449. Id. at 1055 (citing United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972)).
450. Id. (citing Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948)).
451. Id.
452. Id. at 1056. The court was satisfied that the district court afforded the
defendant a full opportunity to rebut the government's allegations. Id.
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heard. Only when the defendant raises a truly reasonable
suspicion as to the validity of the subsequent arrest must a more
formal inquiry take place. Whereas, if the defendant offers either
no excuse or no reasonable explanation for his subsequent arrest,
an evidentiary hearing into the matter is not required.

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
453
Hope v. Perales
(decided March 23, 1993)

Plaintiffs, who included "income-eligible women, physicians
and various health care organizations,"

454

claimed that the New

York State Prenatal Care Assistance Program455 (hereinafter
PCAP) is violative of the New York State Constitution because it
does not include finaifcial assistance for "medically necessary
abortions" for similarly situated women eligible under PCAP
provisions.456 Plaintiffs, seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief,457 contended that the "funding scheme" 45 8 violated their
453. 189 A.D.2d 287, 595 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1st Dep't 1993) (per curiam).
454. Id. at 290, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
455. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw §§ 2520-29 (McKinney 1993). An "eligible
service recipient" is defined under § 2521 as:
[A] pregnant, low-income woman, who is not otherwise eligible for
medical assistance and whose income is one hundred eighty-five percent
or less of the comparable federal income official poverty line ....
Pregnant women eligible pursuant to this subdivision shall continue to be
eligible for assistance, without regard to any change in income of the
families of which they are members, through the end of the month in
which a sixty day period which begins on the last day their pregnancies
shall end.
Id.
456. Hope, 189 A.D.2d at 291, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
457. Id. at 290, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
458. Id. at 291, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 950. PCAP's funding scheme is set forth
in Chapter 584 and § 2522 of the New York Public Health Law, which
provides:
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